his article explores the links between welfare participation and broader forms of political involvement. Adopting a political learning perspective, I present evidence that policy designs structure clients' program experiences in ways that teach alternative lessons about the nature of government. Through their experiences under a given policy design, welfare clients develop program-specific beliefs about the wisdom and efficacy of asserting themselves. Because clients interpret their experiences with welfare bureaucracies as evidence of how government works more generally, beliefs about the welfare agency and client involvement become the basis for broader political orientations. I conclude that the views of government that citizens develop through program participation help explain broader patterns of political action and quiescence. W elfare recipients have an unusually visible material stake in government policies. Their immediate fates depend on the actions of public officials, and this fact is routinely underscored by speeches delivered in electoral campaigns and legislative debates. As one client interviewed for this study put it, "whether we get that welfare that keeps us alive depends on who's in office." In light of such strong personal incentives, one might expect welfare recipients to be more politically active than other citizens (Olson 1965). This article offers an analysis of why this is not the case-of why, in fact, public assistance recipients are an especially quiescent group (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).
of them are too withdrawn and dependent to shoulder the burdens of political activism. Elites must then take the lead" (Mead 1992, 227) .
A third possible explanation can be gleaned from arguments that social provision can divert or temper political demand-making. For example, Piven and Cloward (1971) argue that even though welfare benefits empower workers, expansion of poor relief also serves to blunt popular demands during times of unrest. Edelman offers related arguments, pointing out that extensions of relief supply a pacifying reassurance to poor people (1964) and that "helping" images of public assistance can obscure the need for political demandmaking (1977) . By extending these analyses to the individual level, one might suggest a cooptation explanation, that is, benefit provision itself produces demobilizing effects.
In one way or another, each explanation bypasses the experience of welfare participation itself.' By contrast, a fourth possibility is suggested by participatory democratic theories that highlight the educative effects of participation and the ways in which institutional arrangements leave their imprints on citizens (Pateman 1970 ). This political learning explanation can also be derived from social control arguments asserting that welfare programs are designed to shape poor people's behaviors both inside and outside the welfare agency (Piven and Cloward 1971) . Recently, this argument has been articulated in work by Schneider and Ingram (1993 , 1997 on the social construction of target populations.
In our theory of causation, motivations of elected officials are linked to the types of policy designs they construct, which affect people's experiences with the policy and the lessons and messages they take from it. These, in turn, influence people's values and attitudes (including their group identities), their orientations toward government, and their political participation patterns (Schneider and Ingram 1995, 442 ).
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This article presents empirical evidence for this line of theorizing by studying welfare programs as sites of adult political learning (Sapiro 1994 ). I argue that as clients participate in welfare programs they learn lessons about how citizens and governments relate, and these lessons have political consequences beyond the domain of welfare agencies. Program designs structure clients' experiences in ways that shape their beliefs about the effectiveness of asserting themselves at the welfare agency. Because clients associate the agency with government as a whole, these program-specific beliefs, in turn, become the basis for broader orientations toward government and political action.
It is important to point out that the four explanations outlined above are not mutually exclusive. While I do not find much support for the passivity explanation, the political learning argument should be seen as a complement to the other two. For recipients of meanstested welfare benefits, the demobilizing effects of resource scarcity are exacerbated by lessons learned through welfare participation. These influences reinforce rather than displace one another. Similarly, an emphasis on the educative effects of welfare participation does not deny that the material or symbolic value of poor relief can serve to divert political demandmaking. To the contrary, the individual-level political learning approach taken here should be viewed as an elaboration of social control theories that explore the political implications of both the fact and the form of welfare provision (Piven and Cloward 1971).
RESEARCH METHODS AND EXPECTATIONS
This article presents a comparative study of the political effects of participation in a public assistance program (Aid to Families with Dependent Children [AFDC]) and a social insurance program (Social Security Disability Insurance [SSDI] ). The empirical evidence comes primarily from fifty in-depth interviews conducted between August 1994 and August 1995 in a mid-sized midwestern city. This interview sample was evenly divided between AFDC clients and SSDI clients (this sample is described in Appendix A; methods of data collection and analysis are described in Appendix B). To allow for "triangulation" of the findings (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994), three additional sources of data were employed. During 1994 and 1995, I conducted ethnographic fieldwork, principally at a shelter serving homeless AFDC families but also with disability support groups serving recipients of SSDI. To obtain independent evidence regarding client experiences in welfare programs, I also made direct observations at the agencies. Finally, to corroborate findings from the interviews and allow for stronger generalizations, I analyzed survey data from the 1992 NES (Miller et al. 1993 ).
The political learning explanation leads to expectations regarding these data that distinguish it from the other accounts described above. First, unlike the passivity and cooptation explanations, it suggests that welfare receipt should not, by itself, dampen political 364 engagement. Rather, I expect the relationship between welfare receipt and political engagement to vary across policy designs. Based on Schneider and Ingram's (1995, 445) argument that AFDC disempowers its "targets", and for reasons elaborated in the second-empirical section below, I expect only experiences in AFDC to foster lower levels of participation. Second, the political learning explanation predicts that participation differences between AFDC and SSDI will exist even after one accounts for the influence of preexisting characteristics. Third, it suggests that AFDC and SSDI recipients should express views of government and political action that closely follow their views of the welfare agency and client demand-making in welfare programs.
This article is organized to present a chain of evidence that links welfare program designs to patterns of political action. I begin with evidence that AFDC clients are less politically active than SSDI recipients and that this disparity remains after accounting for other characteristics that distinguish the two groups. I then reconstruct the links that connect this outcome to program experiences. First, I show how the designs of SSDI and AFDC lead clients to develop different beliefs about the efficacy of making demands in their programs. Second, I explain why beliefs developed in welfare programs have a spill-over effect on broader orientations toward politics. Third, I provide a detailed analysis of how SSDI and AFDC clients view government and political action, paying particular attention to how these descriptions fit with their earlier accounts of welfare programs. Fourth, I show how program experiences also help explain what, at first, appear to be exceptions to the dominant patterns in the data. Finally, I explore the link between program experiences and internal political efficacy, arguing that low participation rates among AFDC recipients do not flow from a sense of political incapacity.
PATTERNS OF POLITICAL ACTION
Do clients of the U.S. welfare system engage in political action as often as other citizens? If lessons learned through welfare participation influence political involvement, then the answer to this question should vary across programs. This is precisely the pattern reported by Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995, 210) in their comprehensive study of political action, Voice and Equality.
The receipt of benefits per se does not imply a low level of activity. Those who receive non-means-tested benefits such as ... Social Security are at least as active as the public as a whole. In contrast, those who receive means-tested benefits such as AFDC ... are substantially less active than the public as a whole.
Unlike social insurance recipients, public assistance clients were underrepresented in every political activity measured by Verba and his colleagues. The greater participation of social insurance recipients belies the charge that government assistance, by itself, undermines political involvement. The overall pattern, how-ever, may be explained by differences in the prior characteristics of program populations. Although Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995, 219-20) do not identify a specific trait that can account for participation differences across programs, they conclude that the gap probably results from background characteristics rather than program participation itself. 
PROGRAM DESIGN AND CLIENT DEMAND-MAKING
The two tiers of the U.S. welfare system provide very different institutional settings for program participation. Unlike SSDI recipients, AFDC clients experience casework relationships, regular case reviews, and an ongoing need to prove their means-tested eligibility (Gordon 1994, chap. 10). In addition, street-level bureaucrats in AFDC tend to hold more power over clients and possess greater discretion to use it (Handler 1992; Lipsky 1980, 6) . Thus, relative to SSDI, the design of the AFDC program includes more frequent interaction and decision making, and it places clients June 1999 more directly under the supervision of individual caseworkers. These design features serve to define the nature of program experiences. Because the AFDC clients in this study had ongoing casework relationships, they routinely received a summons to the agency backed up by the threat of termination if they did not appear. In responding to these requests, they rarely acted as initiators or saw the agency act responsively. Because of means-testing and mandatory child support enforcement, AFDC clients also were forced to divulge information about subjects they considered private, such as their sexual history and domestic practices. When they went to the agency, they often waited a long time before meeting with the caseworker who determined the disposition of their case.
Through these experiences, AFDC clients developed a characteristic set of beliefs about the agency and its power in relation to them. First, they came to see the agency as a pervasive threat in their life, as a potent force whose limits were unclear. Second, they perceived their welfare relationships as one-way transactions in which the agency had the authority to issue directives, and client status limited their options to either compliance or exit. Third, their view of agency decision making emphasized the personal discretion of individual workers rather than the rules of the institution. Fourth, they came to understand the agency's capacities for action as an autonomous power over them, rather than as the power to act on their behalf.
Client accounts strongly suggest that these beliefs originated in participation experiences and point to their chilling effects on demand-making. As Nancy explained, I think it's that you learn not to [say anything]. Because you learn that if you upset this woman or make her angry (or this man, but it's mostly women that work there) that if you upset this person in any way, you're going to pay for it. And so, you don't do that. You learn to be quiet, and just take whatever is dished out. To AFDC clients, silence in the face of consequential decision-making processes appears rational because they come to believe that speaking out is both ineffective and risky. Alicia offered clear statements of both these themes when she explained why she did not raise questions or grievances at the agency. A heightened awareness of rules leads many clients to view the SSA as complex. Yet, it also makes clients less fearful of arbitrary uses of authority and more confident that they can gain responses to legitimate requests. As Donna put it, "they have to follow the rules, and so do I." SSDI clients generally expect their input to be effective. Darryl asserted: "If I ever need anything, I know that's their job. They'll be there. I believe they will." SSDI clients do not think they can get whatever they want, but they believe they are active contributors to agency decisions. Sarah captured this view: "Well, if there is any power, I guess they have more than I do. But I haven't come into a situation where I've seen it.... I always feel like I have some say-so in the process." Unlike AFDC clients, most SSDI clients find it hard to imagine how raising a grievance could open them up to retribution. Bridget commented: "I would feel comfortable bringing anything up with them. Why not? What could the problem be?" The sharp differences in beliefs expressed by clients in the two programs are accompanied, not surprisingly, by strong differences in their willingness to raise grievances in their welfare programs.5 Only one of twentyfive SSDI clients (4%) reported she would not speak up if she had a major problem. By contrast, seventeen of twenty-five AFDC clients (68%) said they would be unwilling to raise a grievance under almost any condition. Eight AFDC participants were more willing to speak up (32%), but even this group said it would do so only in relatively extreme situations.
The higher level of reticence expressed by AFDC informants was strongly corroborated by my observations at the shelter, where homeless residents routinely resisted the idea of contacting caseworkers about problems, even under crisis conditions. Circumstantial evidence of this dynamic also can be found in previous research. For example, in an exit poll of AFDC clients, Goodsell (1980) found that only 6.7% reported arguing with agency personnel. Handler and Hollingsworth (1971) found that the rate of client-initiated contacts with AFDC workers decreased over time, with more experienced clients less likely to make themselves visible than were people new to the program.
In summary, through their program experiences, AFDC clients come to see agency decision making as an autonomous process, unconstrained by rules and unresponsive to client demands. They believe that, as clients, their low status makes the assertion of grievances both futile and unwise. These beliefs are held consistently across demographic subgroups, and they are strong enough to make clients retreat from decision-making processes that have the most profound and immediate consequences for their family. SSDI clients are more willing to voice complaints because they believe it will be effective and will not put them in jeopardy. Left to navigate the SSA on their own, many clients learn that it is hard to get results from a large, complex bureaucracy, but they also believe they have some control in the relationship and infer that agency responses have to conform to official rules. As a result, SSDI clients expect to be effective if they persevere in advancing legitimate claims.
BRIDGES TO BROADER POLITICS
I haven't been to most of the government. But I'll bet they just treat you the way the welfare office does. That's my fear. They'll treat you the same way. (Hope, an AFDC client).6 When they start talking about voting, I turn the TV [off]. I do. It's no guarantee. This person can make all these promises, but that don't mean they're going to do it. The rest of the government mostly works like the AFDC office. I mean, I don't deal with the government when I can (Vanessa, an AFDC client).7 By shaping participation experiences, program designs influence welfare recipients' views of client status and institutional decision making. But why would these program-specific perceptions spill over into broader beliefs about government and political action? An important clue to this puzzle was suggested by a group discussion I observed in November 1994 at the shelter for homeless families.
Twice each week, the shelter held support group meetings in which residents, more than 80% of whom were in AFDC, could talk with one another about personal problems. Although the subject of AFDC came up frequently at these meetings, broader political issues usually did not. On the night after the 1994 midterm elections, however, there was a welfare rights activist staying in the shelter, whom I will call Carol. At the meeting, Carol chastised the other women for not voting in the election and for (in her opinion) allowing the Republican victory to happen. In the ensuing argument, the almost unanimous response was that voting would have made no difference. Moreover, residents defended their response by arguing that Carol was naive if she did not realize that the rest of government "does what it wants, just like the welfare."
There may be many reasons residents did not vote that day. For example, most were busy trying to find housing, since they soon would have to leave the temporary shelter. But the repeated claim in the meeting was that government, like the welfare agency, was going to do whatever it wanted, and it was useless to get in the way. Over the following year, I found this same theme articulated on many occasions when residents discussed the subject of politics or welfare reform. In a number of cases, the phrase "just like the welfare" was also used by residents as a shorthand for decisions that were made on their behalf but without their input. Sometimes they referred to decisions made by shelter staff, but the comparison to welfare was particularly likely on occasions when the discussion turned to government.
Perceptions of specific welfare bureaucracies persist and are applied to other government institutions because, in the eyes of clients, government is a single system. In interviews, clients from both programs regularly identified welfare bureaucracies as institutions of government. They rarely sorted these institutions into neat administrative and political categories. The primary reason for the spill-over effect, however, is simply that welfare participation provides so many clients with their most direct connection to a government institution. In these cases, the welfare agency serves as clients' most proximate and reliable source of information about how government works. To most of my informants, welfare bureaucracies offer a salient representation of government as a whole. The spill-over effect occurs not because they think their perceptions of the agency transfer to government but because they recognize that they have been dealing with the government all along.
For many clients, this unified view of government is reinforced by media stories about welfare policy debates or electoral campaigns. Not surprisingly, news stories that refer to welfare programs have a special salience for people who depend on them for benefits. These stories frequently present elected officials as policymakers who are responsible for the current or future shape of welfare programs. As these officials outline their plans for Medicare, Social Security, or AFDC, they .appear as a group to be the "executive directors" of welfare agencies. At a minimum, clients tend to infer that program conditions reflect the desires of elected representatives, and in some cases they perceive welfare bureaucrats and legislators as occupants of a single institution. Holly complained: "They don't seem to care at Social Security, and they don't seem to care nowhere else in the Congress. That's the way the government is."
For AFDC recipients, news stories dealing with welfare also tend to have a second effect. When public officials give speeches about welfare reform, they frequently make generalizations about "welfare mothers." To clients, these descriptions often seem degrading and unfair. On several occasions, women recalled turning off the television because they did not want their children to hear what was being said about them. To many clients, news stories on welfare suggest that the degraded position they occupy in the program carries over to the rest of the polity. The stigmatizing discourse on welfare creates a bridge between their status as 368 clients and their status as citizens.8 Celina described this bridge in the following way.
You hear about yourself on TV. They're stereotyping you all the time. And I'm tired of it.... The rest of the government is just like AFDC: You're a number to both, and neither of them care. The government looks at me as someone on AFDC, one of the statistics. I had my kids when I was young. So, that's all they figure they need to know about me. So, the whole government sees me the way the AFDC office does, except for they don't get to swear at me.
Thus, a variety of factors combine to forge a connection between welfare experiences and beliefs about other political institutions. This connection is stronger for some participants than for others. As research on adult political learning leads one to expect (Sapiro 1994) , clients assimilate the lessons of welfare participation into what their life history has already taught them about politics. Consequently, beliefs about the agencies do not always extend to the rest of government. This point is well illustrated by a focused comparison of two SSDI clients.
Darryl is a 44-year-old African American with a high school diploma. He has been homeless many times and has been in prison. Mark is a 36-year-old Native American with a 9th grade education. Like Darryl, he has experienced periods of homelessness and incarceration. One might expect these two men to share uniformly pessimistic views of public institutions, but their attitudes toward government diverge in significant respects. When I asked Mark about government, he referred to experiences in SSDI that he considered to be evidence of government responsiveness, and he emphasized themes that were familiar from his description of the SSA. By contrast, although Darryl similarly considered the SSA to be very helpful and responsive, when it came time to discuss government as a whole his program experiences were eclipsed by his lifetime of marginality. He never mentioned SSDI as he told me about government, and his description of politics emphasized his own powerlessness. Mark and Darryl's divergent responses serve as an important reminder that the spill-over effects of program experiences vary across individuals. For most recipients, however, there seems to be at least some connection between program experiences and general political orientation.
To summarize, clients draw political lessons from their program experiences because welfare agencies are usually the most accessible and consequential government institution in their life. Welfare agencies are easily recognized as a part of government and have clear links to its other branches. For many clients, they serve as the most direct source of information about how government works. For people in AFDC, program experiences also are linked to the rest of political life by news stories that seem to imply the status of "welfare recipient" is as relevant in other government institutions as it is at the agency.
All this suggests that the same experiences that make AFDC clients less willing to challenge the agency may also contribute to their lower level of political involvement. To make this explanation compelling, however, we must consider the content of clients' views of political action and its relation to their views of demand-making in welfare programs.
EXTERNAL EFFICACY: VIEWS OF GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL ACTION
Views of political action flow partly from one's perceptions of government. Political participation seems less worthwhile if policymaking appears to be a directive rather than responsive activity. Even if government officials seem to pay attention to the preferences of some citizens, specific individuals or groups may not expect to receive equal treatment. These sorts of beliefs are a critical element of political efficacy, the feeling that one's activities can influence the political process and that it is worth making the effort to get involved (see Campbell, Gurin, and Miller 1954, 181-94) . Students of political behavior usually distinguish between external efficacy, or beliefs about governmental responsiveness, and internal efficacy, or perceptions of one's own ability to understand and participate in political life (Niemi, Craig, and Mattai 1991). Both forms of efficacy have been shown to be strong predictors of political participation (Abramson 1983, chap. 8), and I will argue that the internal/external distinction is critical for understanding how welfare participation relates to political involvement. In this section, I analyze the effects of program experiences on external efficacy. In a later section, I will suggest that these same experiences have very different effects on feelings of internal efficacy.
To understand clients' beliefs about political action, it is necessary to begin with their more general conceptions of the political system. In interviews, I asked Looking beneath these numbers, it becomes clear that even responses that were coded the same way across the two programs often had different rationales, and these differences echoed program experiences. For 60%ple ofs SSDI clients believe that thyno orgnlyzeo diprt political effirileefcacye sugecastedb cliens gysen-i open to interest groups. Bridget explained: "I would favor some sort of political organization with all of us in it. That kind of organization could make a real difference. We wouldn't have the money to be as effective as the cigarette companies or anything. But they would still have to listen to us because that's the way it works." A majority of AFDC clients also believe that collective action can be effective, but often because they view a mass movement as the only way to force action from an essentially unresponsive government. According to Renee, "they haven't been listening; they never had to; so why would they listen now? What's going to make them listen now?" A typical answer was given by Vanessa, who surmised that if all AFDC recipients joined together, "it would be too many people not to listen." Similar differences in meaning occurred when clients talked about whether government officials listen to people like them. The minority of SSDI clients who gave negative responses to this question usually explained their answer by saying that government officials simply do not listen or are out of touch. By contrast, the large majority of AFDC recipients who gave negative responses tended to link their answer to their own client status. In some cases, they used welfare politics itself as an example. Penny complained: "They listen to welfare advocates but not [clients] ." In most cases, AFDC clients feel that they will not be heard because, as welfare recipients, they occupy a degraded status. In sum, clients in both programs made explicit statements indicating that they draw inferences about government from their experiences with welfare institutions. In addition, they tend to have views of government that mirror the perceptions they developed in their respective programs. Finally, just as AFDC participants are more likely to believe that challenging the agency will be futile, they are also more likely to expect other forms of political action to be ineffective. All these pieces of evidence point toward the conclusion that program experiences affect beliefs about the efficacy of political action.
Again, however, these differences across programs may simply reflect differences in preexisting characteristics. To address this possibility, I first looked for patterns within each program. I did not find systematic relationships for some group differences (e.g., sex and race), but exposure to college education was strongly associated with more efficacious views in both pro- grams. This suggests that one reason SSDI recipients have more optimistic expectations is that they are more likely to have had experience with college (60% vs.
20% in AFDC).
A multivariate analysis of NES data offers an opportunity to control for a wider range of background factors and to test the interview findings with a larger sample. Table 2 Nevertheless, three observations suggest that clients' feelings of external efficacy affect levels of political involvement. First, the link between external efficacy and political participation has been demonstrated repeatedly in political behavior research. Rosenstone and Hansen (1993, 141-5) are typical in making the confident assertion that this connection is supported by "a mountain of empirical evidence." Second, as the women in the shelter demonstrated when they responded to Carol's charge that they had stood by and "let the Republicans win," clients themselves tend to offer these sentiments as explanations for their actions. Third, research in social psychology indicates that attitudes predict behaviors more accurately when they have been developed through direct experience with an "attitude object" (Eagly and Chaiken 1993, 193-202) . Attitudes arising from direct experience tend to have greater clarity and are held with greater confidence. They also tend to be more stable, more readily accessible from memory, and more likely to be activated without conscious effort. Thus, if clients' attitudes toward government come from their direct experiences with government (and clients believe they do), there is little reason to expect the normal relationship between external efficacy and political action to be attenuated for welfare recipients. The AFDC sample was not a homogeneous group. Thirteen clients were enrolled only in the AFDC program, but another twelve had additional experience with organizations that explicitly encourage involvement. In this latter group, eight had children enrolled in Head Start, three were involved in activist organizations, and one participated in both. These twelve were significantly more willing to voice grievances in AFDC than were the thirteen clients who had no outside organizational involvement (67% vs. none, p = .001). Of the four activists in this group of twelve, three were among the minority who were more willing to speak up at the welfare agency. This pattern is consistent with historical evidence that the level of client assertiveness is influenced by social activism (Gordon 1994 We have different views, say, about a disability plan for Head Start. We're like a decision-making body. And it feels good because it's like you're deciding Head Start's policies throughout the city and in our own centers." These experiences leave an imprint on general beliefs about political involvement.
EXPLAINING EXCEPTIONS IN AFDC: THE EFFECTS OF HEAD START
In sum, the evidence indicates that Head Start experiences consistently mitigate or supersede the demobilizing effects of AFDC. This finding suggests a revised view of maximum feasible participation. Like many programs in the War on Poverty, this initiative was judged a failure because it did not live up to the unrealistic standard of "total victory" promised by an "unconditional declaration of war" (Katz 1989, 88) . Indeed, it remains important to recognize the limitations of this policy. Insofar as consensus may often result from the exclusion of difficult issues or competing views (Bachrach and Baratz 1962), we should not be surprised if the addition of clients' perspectives produces misunderstanding, conflict, and a less coherent policy process (Moynihan 1969 ). Likewise, it seems unrealistic to expect participatory designs to erase systemic inequalities or unilaterally "empower" people who are disadvantaged in a variety of ways.
These limitations, however, should not overshadow the importance of meaningful collective decision making for individuals who are often denied effective control over their own life (Handler 1996) . The findings presented here suggest that a more participatory program design.encourages more positive orientations toward political involvement. Head Start provides clients with evidence that participation can be effective and fulfilling. From the perspective of participatory theory, it is not surprising that these experiences have spill-over effects. "The taste for participation is whetted by participation .., a little experience with selfgovernment and political action inspires] a desire for a great deal more" (Barber 1984, 265-6).
INTERNAL EFFICACY: BELIEFS ABOUT ONE'S POLITICAL ABILITIES
I have argued that participation experiences in AFDC undermine feelings of external efficacy. In this section, I address the additional possibility that clients retreat from politics because they lack internal efficacy, or confidence in their political abilities.
According to the passivity explanation, government assistance leads recipients to become dependent and, hence, politically passive. As noted earlier, this claim founders on the evidence that SSDI recipients partici-374 pate at the same rate as other citizens. For two other reasons, however, internal efficacy may still help account for the political quiescence of AFDC recipients. First, some observers argue that passivity and selfdoubt explain why a subset of poor people apply to AFDC in the first place (Gilder 1981 Thus, while AFDC clients frequently complain of low self-esteem related to receipt of welfare, neither this sentiment nor their low level of external political efficacy should be seen as requiring a correspondingly low level of internal political efficacy. AFDC recipients tend to doubt that the government will respond to "people like them" because of their poverty, client status, and/or race and because "that's just the way government is." But while recipients gave many reasons to be pessimistic about political action, these reasons typically did not include a low estimation of their own political ability. Lashell, for example, said that public officials would not listen to her "because I don't have any money and because I'm black." When asked if a lack of political knowledge or skills might make it harder for her to gain a response, she smiled at the suggestion and confidently replied: "Oh, I can talk all day long." Cheryl echoed these sentiments: "I could speak up as much as anybody."
The Young (1995) offers additional evidence that welfare participation leads to a sense of institutional competence and that this perception is generalized to government as a whole. Young asked whether clients valued lawyers as "spokespersons" who could express their views in appropriate language, as "legal experts" who knew existing laws, or as "system insiders" who were familiar with government officials and procedures. She found that other poor people valued lawyers in all three roles, but welfare clients were far less likely to see insider knowledge as something they needed from a lawyer. One client told Young (1995, 18) : "I just know how they are, because I've been dealing with them so long, you know." Young concludes (p. 11):
In contrast with wealthier informants, the welfare poor rarely suggested that insider knowledge was an important advantage gained from legal representation .... The welfare poor often described how experience with "the system" increased their ability to handle their own public benefit issues.
Regardless of whether recipients' high estimates of their own understanding are correct, the interviews conducted by Young (1995) and Sarat (1990) as well as those from the present study suggest that, all else equal, AFDC participation may lead individuals to develop higher evaluations of their own ability to deal with government. This claim can be tested by returning to the NES data and constructing a multivariate model of internal political efficacy. Table 3 shows an OLS regression analysis that predicts placement on a scale created by adding together four newer items that researchers have found to be the clearest and most satisfactory measures of internal political efficacy (on In addition, tests for interactions with other variables in the model suggest that the effects of AFDC participation vary for two groups. First, the significant negative coefficient for the interaction with education suggests that AFDC makes a smaller marginal contribution to internal efficacy among those who have a higher level of education, a finding which makes considerable sense in view of the high level of efficacy already associated with this group. Second, the coefficient for the interaction of AFDC and urban suggests that AFDC participation may boost the internal political efficacy of central-city welfare recipients to a Lessons of Welfare: Policy Design, Political Learning, and Political Action June 1999 degree that is even greater than the effects found among other AFDC recipients.
These regression results corroborate the statements made in the interviews and urge the conclusion that, on average, program participation makes a positive contribution to the belief of AFDC recipients that they have the specific skills and knowledge needed to deal with government. Thus, for evaluating the political consequences of welfare participation, the distinction between internal and external efficacy turns out to be crucial. In their program experiences, AFDC clients see evidence that government institutions are hostile places and that officials do not understand, care about, or respond to "people like them." Yet, these very same experiences also lead clients to infer that they have developed the knowledge and skills needed to deal with government. Women in AFDC tend to believe that they are capable of participating in politics; they simply do not think that anyone in a position of power will listen to them.
CONCLUSION: PUBLIC POLICY AND DEMOCRACY
Few concerns are more fundamental to students of politics than the relationship between public policy and democracy. In most liberal traditions of political theory, citizen participation is cast as a creative force that precedes and determines public policies. This view lies at the heart of systems theories that identify public demands as "inputs" that determine government policy "outputs" (Easton 1965 (Easton , 1971 ). In varying degrees of formality, this view also can be found at the core of economic theories of democracy (Downs 1957 ) and pluralist theories of politics (Dahl 1967) . In these accounts, public policies are the ultimate results of the political process.
From another perspective, however, the vigor of democracy itself appears to be an uncertain outcome that depends on public policies. Various scholars have argued that public policies engender characteristic forms of politics depending on their goals (Lowi 1964 ), the way they distribute costs and benefits (Wilson 1980) , the symbolic cues they express to the citizenry (Edelman 1964) , and the way in which they structure political interaction (Pierson 1993 ). These theories all serve as reminders that citizen involvement is fragile and malleable and that public policies can either support or discourage an engaged citizenry (Schneider and Ingram 1997). As Smith and Ingram (1993, 15) point out, "it is usually believed that in a democracy citizens shape policies. It is less commonly realized that the far-reaching policies of modern governments shape citizens and may do so in directions harmful to democracy."
In the case of welfare programs, both images of this relationship have considerable merit. As the most recent round of reforms has underscored, program designs are outcomes shaped by the fears, hopes, and discontents of policymakers and citizens. Indeed, the responsiveness of public policy to shifting sentiments may be considered a major source of volatility in 376 welfare provision (Heclo 1994) . At the same time, however, welfare policy designs are more than just government outputs. They are political forces that have important effects on the beliefs and actions of citizens. From this perspective, the most significant political outcomes of welfare reform may not be new program requirements or initiatives per se. The more decisive outcomes may be found in the way these design elements affect democracy itself.
Recently, a number of observers have called on scholars and practitioners to "envision a democracy in which policy plays a new role: to empower, enlighten, and engage citizens in the process of self-government" (Smith and Ingram 1993, 1) . To the extent that one values democratic participation, the findings presented here suggest that this value is relevant for assessing the success or failure of welfare policies. Political debates over how welfare programs affect incorporation in the market (i.e., employment) should be,.joined by discussions of how they affect incorporation in the polity.
This article provides an empirical starting point for such a discussion by illuminating how welfare program designs affect political learning. The heart of the matter is that welfare programs provide many people with their most direct exposure to a government institution. When clients think about government, their program experiences provide the handiest and most reliable points of reference. When they think about whether their own political demands can be effective, civics-book images of democracy pale next to vivid impressions of how welfare agencies respond to clients. Program designs not only communicate information about client status and agency decision making but also teach lessons about citizenship status and government.
More generally, the findings presented here suggest the potential for a political learning perspective that links the study of policy design and implementation to the study of political thought and action in mass publics. In a society in which the policymaking process is so often relegated to the status of a distant spectacle (Edelman 1964) , public bureaucracies provide relatively immediate experiences with government. Legislatures may host more dramatic political activities, but the police station, the motor vehicles office, and the Internal Revenue Service are more likely to supply citizens with lessons about government that ring with the truth of first-hand experience. From mundane encounters at the post office to the more total experience of prison life, public bureaucracies should be studied as sites of political learning.
Direct experiences with policy design provide citizens with "scripts" that indicate how they can expect government to act. Under the AFDC program (now Temporary Assistance to Needy Families), clients are given little opportunity to make consequential choices about their own life; they deal with the agency when they are summoned, and they must respond to the detailed questions and directives of their caseworker. What image of government does this convey to a group that already tends to be disadvantaged in political life? The answer seems clear from the evidence presented here. It also seems clear that nothing essential to welfare provision requires these particular lessons. Very different scripts are written for participants in SSDI. In that program, clients are allowed greater privacy and initiative, and it appears that officials have both authority over clients and obligations to respond to their requests. Experiences in both AFDC and SSDI shape clients' views of government. The process of political learning is constant across the programs, but the lessons taught differ sharply.
Head Start provides a third model of how public policy may affect democracy. In that program, poor parents are brought together with one another to deliberate and make policy. Policy councils formalize the expectation that participants will speak out. They demonstrate that the agency serves the clients, not the other way around. Each month, the parents on the councils see their decisions recorded and (at least some of the time) implemented. The evidence suggests that these experiences matter for democracy. Despite sharing similar backgrounds and program experiences with other AFDC clients, and despite their lower level of education, women in Head Start interviewed here had dramatically different views of government and whether it is worthwhile to become politically involved.
In Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Esping-Andersen (1990, 23) writes: "The welfare state is not just a mechanism that intervenes in, and possibly corrects, the structure of inequality; it is, in its own right, a system of stratification. It is an active force in the ordering of social relations." This comment and the title of the book refer to variation in welfare provision across different political economies. Yet, they also can be appropriated as a fitting end to this analysis of welfare programs as sites of political learning. Through their different designs, AFDC, SSDI, and Head Start construct "three worlds" of welfare participation. Welfare programs not only respond to needs created by a stratified society but also are an active force in the ordering of political relations. The same political process that assembles welfare programs is, in turn, reshaped by its own products.
conversation both before and after the interview, sometimes lasting most of the day, but the semi-structured interviews ranged from forty-five minutes to two and one-half hours. Forty-nine of the interviews were taped using a microcassette recorder; one client preferred to have notes taken by hand. All informants were promised confidentiality in published materials; they were asked to choose their own pseudonym; they were informed that this project had no connection to any government agency; and they were assured that they would not be adversely affected if they declined the interview.
Each interview was transcribed, in its entirety and verbatim, and then printed out for later use in checking the context of individual quotations. I began by analyzing the fifty separate transcripts as coherent wholes. I then extracted quotations from the larger transcripts (up to twenty lines) and printed them on 5" X 8" cards. Although a spreadsheet was used on a few occasions, the vast majority of the data analysis was done by hand-sorting these cards into piles and keeping written lists of the results. technique of factor analysis. I combined these clusters into the smallest number of underlying dimensions that could remain internally coherent and distinctive from one another. As in the statistical technique, the labels for these "factors" were derived and applied after the analysis. In the text, I provide prototypical statements for each of the four views of government so that they can be used (and so that their reliability can be tested) in future research.
The second strategy, often termed "pattern matching" (Yin 1989, 109-13), places greater emphasis on hypothesis testing. Using theory-based expectations as a template, I sorted the evidence to see if it matched the patterns I expected to find. For example, I sorted responses to my questions regarding external efficacy and then compared the resulting patterns to my expectation that there would be differences across programs. I then checked to see whether additional, unexpected patterns could be found and whether the hypothesized differences across programs disappeared after isolating subgroups of clients with similar demographics.
The third analytic strategy involved "explanation building" (Yin 1989, 113-5) , that is, stipulating and investigating a set of causal links between policy design and political action. Based on a pattern-matching analysis for each "link," I tried to establish a logical chain of evidence that moved from (1) program designs, to (2) welfare participation experiences, to (3) beliefs about the nature of welfare relationships, to (4) clients' willingness to voice grievances in welfare programs. Finally, moving through (5) clients' tendencies to identify welfare agencies with government as a whole, the chain ends with (6) differences in levels of political efficacy and (7) differences in rates of political action. The empirical findings regarding internal efficacy were an unexpected pattern, an example of political learning that was not originally stipulated as part of the "chain of evidence."
